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Land Use Zoning In America:
The Case for Inclusionary Policy
Thomas Geffner
Residential zoning code has been one of the most powerful
forces in shaping the growth of modern American cities. By
regulating which types of buildings can go where, zoning code has led
to the creation of suburbs as we know them, with row after row of
detached single-family homes. Indeed, the American city would look
drastically different if it were not for the creation of zoning codes. But
how did the institution that is American zoning come to exist? This
essay will attempt to answer that question by exploring the early
history of zoning, starting in the 1910s. It will also look at the impact
of zoning on America’s poorest residents. Has the division of
residential zones into mostly large lots with minimum home sizes
excluded the poor from the suburbs? The correlation between zoning
and economic exclusion has been studied, and a strong connection
discovered. Given this, what can be done to remedy the problem? An
alternative to current law, inclusionary zoning, has been explored and
shows promise for fixing some of the problems that current zoning
creates.
According to the Encyclopedia of Housing, zoning refers to
the “enactment and enforcement of legislation by local governments
to control the development of land by regulating its use” (Weinstien
2012, 791). This regulation, which controls features such as lot size
and building height, allows municipalities to determine, with great
precision, what type of buildings will get built in their towns. At a
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broader level, zoning allows for the forced separation of land uses. It
is this part of zoning that is most easily noticeable: the majority of
suburban communities in America exist as they do because of landuse separations.
Zoning has existed for hundreds of years. In ancient China,
writer Kuan-Tzu spoke of the benefits of land-use separation (Salsich
2003). The actual practice of zoning as a means of control started in
Germany in the 1880s in the suburb of Altona (Weinstein 2012). The
export of zoning to America began in the early 1900s. For city
planners, zoning was seen as a way to steer urban development in a
direction that would benefit the community as a whole. For real estate
developers and business owners, zoning was a useful tool to maintain
property values (Weinstein 2012). In addition to support from
intellectuals and special interests, zoning was extremely popular
among the public (Fischel 2001). It is this broad appeal that allowed
zoning to rapidly take off in America. By 1916, eight cities had some
form of zoning ordinance in place, and over the next 20 years, an
additional 1300 municipalities adopted land control techniques
(Fischel 2001).
Zoning was first implemented in America in New York City
during 1916 (Weinstein 2012) to control rampant overcrowding
(Salsich 2003). In 1924, the US Chamber of Commerce created the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA). The SZEA created a
standard framework that states could follow in order to implement
zoning (University of Pennsylvania Law Review 312). It established
zoning as a “police power” that did not require amendments to a
state’s constitution in order to be legal (Standard State 1924). Two
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years later, the Supreme Court weighed in on the legality of zoning in
the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.
The court sided with the Chamber of Commerce, again emphasizing
that zoning was a legitimate use of police power (Weinstein 2012).
After this decision, the legality of zoning was unarguable. As zoning
had passed through both legislative and judicial branches at the
federal level, states were encouraged to create comprehensive zoning
plans. By 1930, 80% of America’s urban population lived in
municipalities with zoning controls, many of which were patterned
off of the 1916 New York ordinance (Weinstein 2012).
For the municipal government, zoning was a welcome
addition to city code. As developments in public transit allowed a
steady stream of workers to flock to suburban housing, newly
incorporated fringe cities faced massive increases in population.
These once quiet municipalities were unprepared for the growth. As
subdivisions were built at a rapid pace, cities faced the prospect of
expensive infrastructure construction. By zoning large minimum lot
sizes, the towns were able to limit the money that they would need to
spend on services (Fischel 2001). Additionally, as noted by Fischel,
zoning helped enable towns to levy efficient property taxes, and
guarantee high tax returns by limiting the economic makeup of
communities.
Among homeowners, zoning was equally embraced. As
workers moved out of the cities and bought suburban houses, they
sought ways to protect their investments. A home was, in most cases,
the biggest capital asset that an individual would ever own, so
homebuyers logically feared anything that might cause their property
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values to lower. These fears led homeowners to support residential
zones that were free of commercial and industrial institutions and
were made up of people of the same socioeconomic class.
Development patterns prior to zoning laws reflected these desires. In
an attempt to appeal to the masses, developers created neighborhoods
of homogenous income and attempted to control land-use in their
subdivisions (Fishcel 2001). In order to shield communities from
encroaching commercial and industrial uses, subdividers utilized
protective covenants. However, these protective covenants were only
able to control lands within the subdivision; outside these areas was a
free-for-all where “incompatible uses” existed (Fischel 2001).
Homeowners were fearful of these “incompatible uses,” especially
multifamily dwellings (Salsich 2003). In order to receive the
protection that failed covenants could not provide, residents turned to
their municipal governments, pressuring local administration to adopt
zoning codes.
Although zoning has been seen as a great gift for the middleclass homeowner, not all members of society have benefited from
these exclusive ordinances. By limiting the development of
multifamily (apartment) housing, zoning has reduced the supply of
dwellings that are within reach for the poorest Americans. Opposition
to adjacent apartment communities has long been an issue for singlefamily homeowners. The general societal distaste of multifamily
housing was well reflected in cases heard in the courts, and when
presiding over Euclid v. Ambler, Justice Sutherland delivered an
opinion referring to apartment houses as “a mere parasite, constructed
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
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surroundings created by the residential character of the [single-family
home] district” (Euclid v Ambler 1926). Large-scale single-family
zoning offered homeowners safety from these ‘parasitic’ dwellings.
When multifamily development is excluded from a residential zone,
families who cannot afford a single-family home are locked out of the
region. A report published by the American Planning Association
(APA) which looked at multifamily housing, zoning policy and
affordability across several different cities in the United States found
that zoning regulations can indeed serve as a barrier in the creation of
multifamily housing. Although apartment housing is not always
affordable (and single-family homes are not always expensive), the
APA found that communities with the most barriers to multi-family
housing development were often the most expensive (Knapp 2007).
Zoning has been found to increase the price of single-family homes,
which provides a further barrier for low income families. Although
the extent of this effect has been argued, a review of the literature
conducted by Quigley and Rosenthal concludes that “a number of
credible papers seem to bear out theoretical expectations [that zoning
limits the supply of buildable land and thus leads to larger and more
expensive homes]” (Quigley 2005). Salsich and Glaeser, two
prominent researchers studying the impact of zoning, investigate cost
increases due to zoning. Salsich looks at growth management efforts
in Florida, finding that they have led to “reduced housing affordability
in a statistically significant character” (Salsich 2003, pg. 8). He draws
upon previous scholarship to show six zoning techniques that
effectively exclude poor residents. These techniques include control
over lots (size and frontage requirements), control over housing size
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(minimum square footage and maximum bedroom numbers) and
control over accessory structures (restrictions on mobile homes and
multiple dwellings per lot) (Salsich 2003). By mandating lot sizes,
zoning restricts buildable land, which in turn lowers the housing
supply. The supply of land is an important part of Glaeser’s work on
housing affordability. He identifies that housing costs across the
country are for the most part close to construction costs (Glaeser
2002). The implication of this is that in expensive areas of the
country, such as New York, Portland or San Francisco, high housing
prices are tied to land value. By limiting the buildable supply of land,
zoning artificially inflates land costs, leading to an affordability crisis
(Glaeser 2002).
Due to the inequalities caused by zoning law, courts have
begun to discuss the legality of these laws. As noted in the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, zoning can deny equal protection under
the law for poor citizens (1972). In 1975 and 1983, the New Jersey
Supreme Court passed a series of decisions known as the Mount
Laurel Doctrine which required municipalities to actively address the
issue of affordable housing. Although the doctrine has provided a
concrete framework, it has simply not been upheld in practice (Talbert
2005). While zoning can be amended at a local scale, court hearings
of this type are problematic because participation is limited to
developers and neighboring residents (University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 1972). This has the unfortunate effect of excluding
members of the community who would advocate to change the zoning
code. Zoning is implemented at a municipal level, meaning that court
decisions at a statewide or higher level are unlikely to remedy the
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situation. Also, due to the ruling that zoning is a police power, it can
be challenging for community members to have their voices heard
regarding zoning issues. Finally, owing to the precedent of Euclid v
Ambler, the courts as a whole favor the idea of zoning, having
reinforced it as a reasonable use of the police power. The University
of Pennsylvania Law Review has concluded that the many barriers to
effective litigation render it extremely unlikely that a solution to
America’s zoning problem can and will be found in the courts (1972).
It would seem as though zoning in America is here to stay.
Powerful factors have helped to entrench the practice of zoning in
American society. These factors include homeowners, who seek to
protect their assets, as well as judicial decisions continually affirming
the legitimacy of zoning. However, there is increasing pressure to
reform zoning law from social justice advocates and community
organizers. It is clear that a change to this institution is necessary. The
technique of inclusionary zoning has been explored by communities
as a way to right the inequities that zoning has caused.
Where traditional, also known as exclusionary zoning, tends to
limit the economic makeup of neighborhoods, inclusionary zoning
does just the opposite, helping to foster diversity (Talbert 2005). This
goal is accomplished by mandating that a certain percentage of units
in new developments be “affordable.” The definition of “affordable”
is set by the municipality or state undertaking the inclusionary zoning,
and usually is designed to be accessible for families making less than
80% of the median income. In addition, inclusionary zoning typically
includes concessions or buyouts to developers in exchange for
providing the affordable units (Talbert 2005). Several scholars have
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advocated this technique as a potential solution to the affordable
housing crisis in America (Salsich 2003, Blaesser et. Al. 2002, The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1972).
There are a number of successful examples of inclusionary
zoning in America. According to Talbert, this technique has produced
over 100,000 units as of 2005 (Talbert 2005). Specific communities
that have been successful in implementing inclusionary zoning
include Cambridge, Massachusetts (Blaesser et. Al. 2002) and the
Miami Valley region in Ohio (The University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1972). Overall, the inclusionary zoning movement is gaining
momentum, and 24 states now have some level of comprehensive
zoning law to address affordable housing concerns (Salsich 2003).
However, municipalities interested in creating inclusionary zoning
laws must be mindful, as there have been several notable failures of
this technique, including Barnstable, Massachusetts (Blaesser et. al.
2002). Communities interested in inclusionary zoning should look to
municipalities such as Cambridge and Miami Valley as guides.
The effective implementation of inclusionary zoning relies on
several basic tenants. First, it is important to note that inclusionary
zoning has faced controversy and litigation, and will continue to do so
(Talbert 2005). Mandating that a certain percentage of units in a
developments be affordable will likely reduce developers’ returns.
Many of the developers may be unwilling to trade potential profits for
general societal benefit. However, as growth relies on developers, it
will be incumbent for municipalities to cooperate with developers in
order to create change. Indeed, the National Housing Conference
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suggests that municipalities work with developers when creating new
inclusionary zoning laws (Blaesser et. al. 2002).
If inclusionary zoning laws are rigid to the point that they
prevent developers from meaningful profits, these laws will likely be
challenged in court, as happened in Barnstable. Traditionally, the
courts have sided with developers in these cases, declaring it
unconstitutional for the government to prevent an individual from
receiving a reasonable return on their land. Preventing this profit is
referred to as a “taking” (Blaesser et. al. 2002). In the case of
Barnstable, the inclusionary zoning laws were found to constitute a
“taking” and were thus labeled an “illegal tax” (Ibid, pg. 14).
It is possible for municipalities to offset the loss of profit by
providing incentives to developers. Bobrowski suggests a system of
“carrots and sticks” in order to win over developer support (Ibid, pg
7). The carrots in question can be provided in the form of density
bonuses. Where mandatory set asides alone make profit difficult
(Salsich 2003), this difficulty can be mitigated when developers are
allowed to build an increased number of units on a given site. Density
bonuses have been found to be an enticing solution by the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review and Salsich (Salsich 2003, The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1972). For cities, allowing
higher density is a no-cost incentive, a trait that makes it especially
appealing to municipalities that do not have large budgets for
affordable housing.
Finally, for inclusionary zoning to be successful, it needs to be
broad and flexible. A collection of overly specific rules and
complicated regulations will slow the development process and bog
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down the creation of affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning is most
successful if municipalities are open to change and are willing to
consider situations on a case by case basis (Blaesser et. al. 2002).
Again, cooperation with developers is necessary. If rules are too
specific, developers will likely exploit this with the use of creative
work-arounds, a phenomenon observed by the National Housing
Council (Blaesser et. al. 2002).
Zoning represents a major paradigm in American housing. It
has shaped, and continues to shape, residential development across
the country. Although zoning has historically had a negative impact
on the availability of affordable housing, it remains largely unchanged
to this day. As housing prices continue to rise across the country, it
has become necessary to rethink zoning codes in order to equally
serve all Americans. The technique of inclusionary zoning is a way to
meet the needs of poor citizens, while guarding home property values
from unwelcome intrusion. Inclusionary zoning has faced some
controversy. Regardless, early adoption in some communities has
been encouraging, and its ability to create more affordable housing
should outweigh any controversies. Municipalities looking to increase
their supply of affordable housing would be wise to consider the
possibility of inclusionary zoning.
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